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Abstract

There is a lot of literature about implementing information systems and numbers of papers
describe failures and successes in implementations. Problems impede successful outcomes of
information system projects, influencing e.g. on the interaction between project parties or on
the learning process, slowing it down and killing time. Problems in implementing information
systems are connected with risks and accident models can be used to describe causes of
failure. This paper describes how a hierarchical accident model is a suitable framework
when modeling information system failures. This study presents findings in literature and
empirical experiences concerning problems. The empiric case comes from the university
world where several universities acted as one client, taking into pilot use a common
information system to support student mobility between the universities.
Keywords: Obstacles, Risks, Accident models, Information system, Implementation

1. Introduction
The implementation of an information system (IS) is a process that very likely leads to failure
instead of success (Lyytinen and Hirschheim 1987; Lyytinen and Lehtinen 1987; Sauer 1993;
Kumar et al. 1998; Schmidt et al. 2001). This paper presents how using the hierarchical
framework introduced by Leveson (2001) a new approach can be found. The obstacles or
problems which are found in the empiric case are presented using a model which is not
commonly known in the context of information systems.
This research pays attention to findings in literature and in a case where an IS was
implemented (Halonen 2004a). It concentrates on the obstacles impeding the success of the
implementation project and considers obstacles and risks being related to each other.
Therefore the authors offer methods to help identifying obstacles and risks that are related to
implementation projects. By using the Hierarchical Accident Model introduced by Leveson
(2001) the problems are presented in three levels. This model was originally developed to
analyses of accident causation. We suggest that the model can also be connected with
problems and thus help in recognizing and managing them.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next chapter introduces literature related to
implementing information systems. After that, the accident models are described. Then we
describe the research methods and study material, following with the case description.
Combined results come next, constituting the main results of the research. This paper ends
with conclusion.

2. Related Literature
There is a lot of literature concerning implementing information systems. This paper
considers implementing information systems as Laudon and Laudon (1988) defined it: “All
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organizational activities working toward the adoption, management, and routinization of an
innovation”. Developing and implementing an IS are instances of organizational change
(Davis and Olson 1985) and they often lead to changes in work processes and structures of
the personnel (Eason 1988; Sahay and Robey 1996). As Lorenzi and Riley stated (2003), all
shortcomings that impede successful outcome lead to stress and change-resistive behaviors.
Literature recognizes success factors and measures that are useful when evaluating the
success or failure of an IS project (Lucas 1981; Markus 1983; Lyytinen and Lehtinen 1987;
Kumar et al. 1988; DeLone and McLean 1992). Therefore, we present here some issues
which are seen as obstacles: conflicts, social dynamics, lack of knowledge or lack of sharing
it, user participation, management problems, resistance to change and, commitment to an IS
project.
Conflict literature discusses recognizing conflict and preconditions for managing conflicts
(Bodtker and Jameson 2001). According to them, recognizing an increasing conflict in the
relationships between project people demands that the emotions of the people involved are
identified and thus the possibilities to manage the conflict are better. Barki and Hartwick
(2001) deliberated how conflict management and the level of interpersonal conflict affect
outcomes of IS projects. They proposed five models to manage conflicts: asserting,
accommodating, compromising, problem solving and avoiding. These models seem natural to
be used also in the current research. Newman and Robey (1992) represented a social process
model to guide research in the social dynamics of system development. Their model
described episodes and encounters involving both the users and the designers, and because of
the altering situation interaction between the parties, the model proved to be dynamic. The
experiences of the authors of this paper show that the encounters between project parties
seem to act in the same way.
Mumford (2003) expounded on solving problems by understanding social dynamics of the
problem and identifying pressure points. Mumford (2003) continued by clarifying that it is no
use removing symptoms instead of causes. She added that lack of knowledge hinders the
problem-solving process in the beginning, when clarification and description of the problem
are important. Lack of knowledge is emphasized also in the article of Ljungström and Klefsjö
(2002) who studied obstacles in implementing a strategy of a total quality management
(TQM) system. They described obstacles as “barriers and hurdles obstructing the flow of
activities and changes in behavior, which are ultimate aims in the quest for an organization’s
improvement”. Ciborra and Andreu (2001) discussed knowledge related to organizational
context. They believed that managing knowledge differs in different organizational contexts.
The role of user participation in IS developments and implementations has been under
discussion (Markus 1983; Markus and Benjamin 1996; Sahay and Robey 1996; Kumar et al.
1998; Cairns and Beech 1999; Dewulf and van Meel 2002; Jiang et al. 2002; Mumford 2003).
Newman and Noble (1990) described in a case study that the contribution is not always
evident and that the user participation is only weakly associated with the success of
implementation. User participation can be also seen as a security threat and therefore user
participation may be rejected in IS projects (c.f. Siponen 2002). On the other hand, user
participation can bring expertise and know-how to the project and it may be essential in cases
when the designer is not familiar with the branch (e.g. Halonen 2004b).
Benamati and Lederer (2000) discussed the management problems in information technology
changes. They raised the challenges in front and point to information technology acquisitions
and implementation processes. Lyytinen and Lehtinen (1987) concluded that basically all
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problems in information systems development can be blamed to derive from technical
problems. This can be seen as level one or three problem in the hierarchical accident model.
On the other hand, Griffith and Northcraft (1996) found that less than 10 percent of
implementation failures stemmed from technical problems and most of them occurred
because of human and organizational reasons, including users’ misunderstanding of the
technology.
Macri et al. (2002) presented a grounded theory for resistance to change and express that
resistance to change can lead to reduced co-operation in an organization. According to them
resistance to change is linked with organizational and shared learning. By hindering shared
learning the members in the organization guard their personal knowledge and gained
experience. Lorenzi and Riley (2003) emphasized the need of effective management of
resistance to change and to turn resistance into commitment.
Commitment to an IS project work has been recognized as a success factor (e.g. Lucas 1981).
Newman and Sabherwal (1996) studied commitment in their longitudinal study and they
found that the level and changes in commitment are significant factors in the project.
According to them, erratic commitment can increase the loss in the IS project e.g. when
management level does not want to get rid of a project that is failing.
According to Lorenzi and Riley (2003) shortcomings in project management, technology and
organizational issues turn to be main causes for problems, added with information explosion.
They raise three sets of skills that are needed in order to avoid problems: 1) technical skills,
2) project management skills, and 3) people and organizational skills.
According to Effron (2004) there is no incentive to share knowledge, meaning that people are
busy with their tasks even without the need to write their knowledge to any databases. Effron
(2004) continued that learning to share knowledge needs overcoming cultural obstacles.
Culture and social background has its impact on changes in organizations and implementing
new technology (e.g. Noble 1986; Walsham 1993; Halonen 2004c).
In addition, it is not always self-explanatory if an IS project is a success or failure. According
to Sauer (1993) an IS development project is a failure when the management terminates it.
Larsen and Myers (1999) discussed what if an information system turns to be a failure even if
it was already evaluated to be successful. Halonen (2004b) described an implementation
project that seemed to be a failure but instead it might have been a step forward in the
technological progress in that environment.

3. Framework
This research was carried out in order to find out how the obstacles in implementing
information systems could be assessed. Furthermore, the study expresses how the means of
risk management and accident investigation can be used in managing obstacles. Accidents
models are used to explain how and why accidents occur and what events or circumstances
are behind accidents.
A well known accident model is the domino model where Heinrich (1931) proposed that
accidents are caused by people, not matters. In his model, there are five dominoes: 1) An
ancestry or a social environment which leads to 2) the fault of a person, and is a proximate
reason for 3) an unsafe act or a condition and it causes 4) an accident that leads to 5) an injury
or losses. When the first domino falls, all other dominoes will fall down too. If any of the
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dominoes will be removed, it will break the sequence and prevent injury or losses. The first
falling domino is treated as an initiative event and it is a stopping point in tracing back what
has happened. In Heinrich’s model this event was considered to be some kind of human error
or a component failure. Even no failure happens also number of “it-was-close” situations can
be meaningful. These indicate exposure to risk even no loss has occurred. By analyzing these
events we can be more aware of risks exposure.
Civil Aeronautical Board (1962) introduced “multi-linear-events sequence” model where
several parallel chains of events are created based on data from a flight data recorder. This
was one of the first methods that used several parallel event chains to explain causes of
accident. Implicitly this means that there might be several obstacles or event sequences,
which can not cause harm by them selves but all together can cause significant failure. In US
National Safety Council Model (in Leveson 1995, 191) was one important discovery. Its
basic is close to the domino model but just after immediate factors of accident there is a
“Point of No Return”. McClay (2003) used a term “Point of Irreversibility”. When this point
has been reached some measurable losses or failures will come up. Before that there is a way
to prevent losses and go back to the normal action.
The Domino and some related process models have been criticized because most accidents
involve variety of events and conditions. Identifying only a single factor as a root reason for
accident is misleading and can be a hindrance in preventing future accidents. E.g. Lewycky
(1987, 6-8) criticizes that we often isolate one condition and call it “the cause” and other
conditions that are “contributory” to the basis for these distinctions are not found. Also
Leveson (1995, 56) argued that most accidents in well-designed systems involve two or more
low-probability events occurring in the worst possible combination and major accident often
stems to flaws in security culture or society and organization Leveson (1995, 53).
Especially overconfidence and complacency (which is common element in major accidents)
are typical. This means that a single event seldom is a real cause to an accident or there
simply is not such a single event which can start a chain of accidents - there might be several
parallel or nonparallel events which might start a chain of accidents.
Sometimes accidents may be prevented most effectively not by eliminating direct causes
identified by the chain of events, but by indirectly manipulating other factors. The
hierarchical accident model (Lewycky 1987, Leveson 1995, Leveson 2001) provides multiple
models of accident causation at different levels of abstraction. In the three-level model
(Figure 1) the lower level describes the accident mechanism (the chain of events). The second
level includes conditions or lack of conditions that affect to the occurrence of events at the
first time. Factors in the third and the highest level, sometimes called root causes or
systematic factors, affect general classes of accidents. They are weaknesses of technical,
human, organizational, managerial, or social nature that not only contribute to the accident
being investigated but are likely to affect classes of accidents in the future. Often responses to
accidents involve fixing only a specific condition while leaving the general systemic factors
untouched. Countermeasures aimed at preventing accidents described by hierarchical models
require making changes at all levels, particularly the systematic factors in the level three.
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Level 3. Systemic Factors

Level 2. Conditions

Level 1. Events or Accident Mechanism

Figure 1.

The Hierarchical Accident model ( Leveson, 2001, 9).

According to Leveson (1995, 47), large scale engineering systems are more than just a
collection of technological artifacts: They are reflections of the structure, management,
procedures and a culture of an engineering organization that created them and they are
usually a reflection of a society where they were created and used. Causes of accidents are
frequently, if not almost always, rooted in the organizations - their culture, management, and
structures. Also Rasmussen (1997) emphasized this. An IS implementation success has
several analogies to accidents that happen in large and complex systems. In both cases
usually no single cause of failure can be named as a cause but rather a sequence of several
events which together finally cause losses or failure.

4. Research Method and Study Material
Action research is argued to be ideal for studying information systems in practice
(Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1998). A combination of action research (Schön 1983; Ayas
and Zeniuk 2001) and public reflection-in-action (Heiskanen 1995; Raelin 2001; Mason
2002; Coghlan and Brannick 2003) has been chosen as the research method because of the
strong involvement of the first author and the participants in the empiric case. There has been
discussion about action research having several different forms (e.g. Baskerville and
Wood-Harper 1998) and this study at hand performs action research without recognizable
cyclical process.
According to Mason (2002), at the heart of all practice lies noticing: noticing an opportunity
to act appropriately. To notice an opportunity to act requires three things: being present and
sensitive in the moment, having a reason to act, and having a different act come to mind.
Furthermore, an academic actor-researcher (Lallé 2003) as a concept belongs to this study by
meaning researcher working in an organization and generating new scientific knowledge.
Ayas and Zeniuk (2001) emphasized “effective collaboration between academics and
managers, thus benefiting both practice and theory, enhancing the significance of research,
informing both practitioners’ and academics’ views and actions”.
The research presents findings from literature and from a case study. It is essential that the
case offers possibilities for learning and getting better understanding about implementations
in different environments (Stake 2000) and therefore it is a pertinent choice in this paper.
According to Yin (2003) “using case studies for research purposes remains one of the most
challenging of all social science endeavors”. The case is reported by bearing the idea of van
der Blonk (2003) when he stated that cases are written with a purpose that heads to the goal
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of the research project. He continued that the researcher is interpreting the case when writing
it down. The case is described in detail enough in order to give a good understanding of the
environment and to help the reader to get a view of actions that were performed.
The case comes from the university world where several universities were involved as one
client and designing and implementing one IS to support the management of student mobility.
This case is an intrinsic case (Stake 2000) offering diversified environment with several
interest groups and project parties. The empirical material is gathered from the memos and
memorandums from meetings and encounters, and from the personal observations made by
the first author. Van Maanen (1988) remarks that field data are constructed from talk and
action and thus they are interpretations of other interpretations and that they are mediated
many times. Van Maanen continues that case studies are presented with differing styles. This
paper presents the case realistic, pointing critically out some issues that behave like obstacles.
Like Coghlan and Brannick (2002) suggest, the researcher has written a personal diary during
her working in the case. In qualitative research studies the benefit of diaries is realized when
writing out the cases (Newbury 2001). The purpose of personal notes is to facilitate the
research process through recording observations, thoughts and questions when they happen to
be used by the researcher (Newbury 2001). The approach is subjective and reflecting on the
past of the researcher, relying on the remarks of Frankl (1963) when he states how our
experiences and past have made us what we are. In this sense the approach is also
interpretative (Walsham 1993) because the approach is very subjective, the observations and
findings reflecting strongly on our personal presence. Mason (2002) states: “Writing
autobiographical and other notes, keeping a journal, and mentally re-entering salient
moments can assist professional development and be integral to research”.

5. Empirical Findings
The case comes from the university world where several universities were involved as one
client and designing and implementing one IS to support the management of student mobility
between Finnish universities. It is expected that the movement increases multiply during the
following years. The first author was working as a project manager in a project that produced
an IS project called MoSu. It was based on a previous effort when specifications and a
demonstration model of the user interface for the new IS were made by other actors during
preceding years. In the first phase MoSu was to be piloted by three universities in the
Helsinki metropolitan area but the use will be extended to be nationwide in the following
years. In addition to the universities, the Finnish Virtual University (FVU) participated into
the project. Other main stakeholders were two vendors and the Ministry of Education that
funded the project. The vendors began their work on the basis that MoSu will cover the
whole process of student mobility between universities.
The MoSu project had started in very versatile circumstances where the specifications and
plans had changed along the time and some specifications were not completed because of the
lack of resources in previous years. Changes in the personnel necessitated knowledge sharing
between the former project personnel and the current personnel. Because the administration
of the mobility differed in every university, the three universities pointed out the importance
of piloting while the FVU emphasized the importance of getting a nationwide IS. Discussion
continued when the FVU announced its new project FlexStu that was to serve students
nationwide in applying for rights to study in other universities. This project seemed like a
competitive project for MoSu and it surprised all other participants in the meeting. Steps were
never discussed openly and the competition between these projects had reverberated to all
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encounters and meetings of the MoSu project. The changes in the requirements had given
extra difficulties to the vendors (and the project manager) to understand the scope of MoSu
because FlexStu was to implement the first steps in the mobility support.
The user authentication and user administration will be one of the crucial tasks to be catered
before MoSu would have access to the information systems in different universities. The
knowledge sharing between FlexStu and MoSu appeared to be problematic; one vendor
owning the information concerning FlexStu and the other vendor having main responsibility
of carrying out the new IS. Holding knowledge has been evident, slowing down the
co-operation between vendors and inflicting on discussions and meetings. Then again the role
of FlexStu was changed to implement a uniform application and to give extensive
information about studies in other universities.
The nature and amount of information that were discussed in the project meetings seemed to
appear problematic. The representatives of student affairs offices were not interested in
technical details but the technique was important when e.g. the processing rules of
applications had to be specified and decisions made. The vendor tried to explain everything
in depth in order to help the officials from student affairs offices to understand the functions.
There were problems with the information in two ways: there were too much technical
information addressed to wrong people and there were insufficient information delivered
between the experts.
Culture and social background as well as economical competition may also be an obstacle
when they appear like impeding the implementation process. The case has shown that
working in a university world has been free and there is not much power of commands. This
means that things will be done when somebody feels them important – not because someone
else tells to do them. In this sense freedom can be seen as an obstacle when it is preventing
the performance of work and commitment to common goals.
In February 2004 the financier arranged an information seminar that was addressed to the
directors of EDP offices in universities and polytechnics. The aim of the seminar was to
introduce MoSu and FlexStu as being a common intent in supporting the student mobility.
This seminar made visible the overlapping role of the two projects. These actions proved the
problem with overlapping in projects and their influence on each other. The overlapping was
not preventing the whole implementation of MoSu but it was really hindering the designing
of it. At the beginning of the collaboration between the FVU and the MoSu project there
appeared to be competition about the tool to be used.
The implementation has proceeded to the piloting phase and so far the case expresses four
interesting obstacles: several parties involved, disputes over focus, overlapping projects,
power game between project members. In this case the obstacles were related to each other,
affecting on the implementation and impeding the progress.

6. Combined Results
This paper introduces a model to be used when managing obstacles that may appear in
implementing information systems. The model is developed for analyzing accident causation
at different levels of abstraction. However, the authors believe that also IS implementations
will gain from the hierarchical accident model introduced by Leveson (2001).
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When using hierarchical accident model, findings from previous IS literature (Table 1)
mostly seem to belong to levels two and three. This supports assumptions made by Leveson
(2001), Lewycky (1987) and Rasmussen (1997) that failures are not primarily caused because
of direct event sequence but because of poor conditions and systematic factors and obstacles
in social, cultural, organizational and technological level.
Authors(s)

Found obstacles

Level 3 Noble 1986, Walsham 1993, Halonen 2004c
Systemic Newman and Robey (1992),
factors
Griffith and Northcraft (1996)
Macri et al. (2002), Lyytinen and Lehtinen
(1987)
Lorenzi and Riley (2003)
Level 2 Bodtker & Jameson (2001), Barki and
Conditions Hartwick (2001),
Ljungström and Klefsjö (2002), Mumford
(2003), Ciborra and Andreu (2001), Effron
(2004)

Level 1
Event
chain
Table 1.

Inappropriate culture and social
background, Social process
episodes
Users’ misunderstanding of the
technology, Technology itself
Resistance to change and
structural inertia, Poor change
management
Conflict with emotion
Lack of knowledge, Poor
knowledge sharing
Inactiveness

Poor user participation
Markus (1983), Markus & Benjamin 1996,
User participation as a
Sahay & Robey (1996), Kumar et al. (1998), manipulative tool
Cairns & Beech (19999, Dewulf & van Meel Poor user contribution,
(2002), Jiang et al. (2002), Mumford (2003). User participation as a security
Newman and Noble (1990), Siponen 2002
threat
Benamati and Lederer (2000)
Newman and Sabherwal (1996),
Unsuitable technology
Lorenzi and Riley (2003),
Erratic commitment
Lucas 1981).
Poor decision making process
Benamati and Lederer (2000)
Outdated technology

Summary of review of IS success literature categorized to hierarchical model.

In case there is no understanding between different parties the interaction can severely be
aggravated. It may lead to difficult problems in continuing the implementation but at least it
will impede the interaction and discussion in the project.
From the experience gained in this case, the authors believe that the impeding problem in
collaboration may lie in the role of the different parties. E.g. the character of the FVU differs
from the roles of the universities. The FVU is not a “real” university but a virtual one and its
main task is to promote and develop networking among universities. MoSu is very much
networking and it might be that the main reason for discomfort in collaboration roots into
power game about owning the networking and mobility between universities. The case
highlighted holding knowledge as an obstacle, preventing the building of collaboration
between vendors and slowing down the requirement specifications that were dependent on
the lacking knowledge. Holding knowledge can be related to working culture – if the working
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culture does not support writing memos from meetings, a lot of knowledge remains
undistributed.
The role of interaction rises in this study. The case showed that with sufficient interaction
overlapping in work could be decreased. It seemed that there were intentional lacks of
knowledge sharing and removing them appeared difficult to manage. The interorganizational
“learning ladders” introduced by Ciborra and Andreu (2001) were not taken into use. The
authors believe that the responsibility of sufficient interaction belongs to the project manager
and she should be able to perceive the lack and insufficiency of interaction. The lack on
perceiving can hinder the implementation process but when handled in time it probably will
not torpedo the implementation.
Some of the recognized obstacles can be classified as organizational obstacles. One obstacle
appeared bigger that any other – overlapping projects – and it can be managed only by
organizational maneuver. Managing two overlapping projects so that overlapping will
disappear, demands organizational skills and ability. In a sense choosing project manager is
also an organizational issue but possible shortcomings may be cured by increasing social
capabilities.
Misunderstanding and lacks of interaction are phenomena of deficiencies in social
capabilities among project participants. Wrong sort of information can affect as an obstacle.
The officials were not interested in what technical way the application form is managed in the
IS. The most important issue appears to be lack of noticing. Without noticing it is not
possible to increase interaction or discussions between project parties. Noticing is needed
also in order to change own attitudes or feelings in encounters. Without noticing
misunderstanding it is not possible to increase understanding or build collaboration between
project parties.
Level 3. Systemic factors

Level 2. Conditions

Several parties involved
Disputes over focus
Overlapping projects
Different working cultures

Power game between projects parties
Changes in specifications and plans
Incomplete specifications
Nature of information
Shorcomings in project management

Level 1. Example of event chain in Failure Mechanism
Competition
between project
parties

Figure 2.

Holding
knowledge

Lack of
co-operation

Hierarchical Model to define obstacles in information system implementation.
Adapted from Leveson (2001).

Figure 2 presents the obstacles from the case categorized in three levels: systemic factors,
conditions and events. This model gives understanding to the relations between obstacles
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placing them into their contexts. It offers a direct, quite well identified process (people,
technique, etc.) which had lead to negative situations. This process is depending on
circumstances and conditions (e.g. poor management, resources, decision making process,
and poor information) where it acts. Circumstances depend on society (or any other large
system where it acts) with poor education, general technology failures, inadequate laws,
instructions, human behavior etc. The authors have shown that a model designed for risk
management can be used also when managing obstacles in information system
implementation. Like analyzing risks it is useful to use models when analyzing obstacles.
Managing problems and obstacles will benefit from the model introduced by Leveson (2001).

7. Conclusion
The hierarchical framework introduced by Leveson (2001) gives a new approach that is not
used in information systems field. When using it in IS success research, categorization of
obstacles and risk factors comes clearer. The tree-tiered hierarchical model is near to
Bateson’s communicative system and its use as framework in the study by Star and Ruhleder
(1996), although point of view differs. This model has also benefits in IS implementation risk
management when selecting suitable methods and controls. Anyway, this demonstrates that
the model needs some improvements.
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